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TWO QUESTIO S ANSWERED 
It is difficult for inhabitants of a consistently unified 
country to form an adequate mental picture of the present 
state of military unrest in China. Among the medley of 
warring military leaders '}'hose names travel rather 
meaninglessly abroad to further confuse the newspaper 
reading public, interested individuals may well ask-"But 
which one is the central force, which the rebel?" 
And there is another fre uently asked question, con-
cerning issues: "Why are t e people of the various sec-
tions of China constantly str I ggling against each other?" 
The answers to both the e questions are short. To 
the first "Neither." To the second "They are not." 
To which seeming paradox this is the explanation: I . (1) There is no centra\ authority in China which 
can be regarded as authentically such; there is merely 
a temporary regime instit~ted by the force of one 
military leader or another according to the fortunes 
of battle, and having only a very slightly extensive 
power, either in point of time or area. Each military 
leader consequently names his opponents "rebels" 
and himself the saviour and would-be unifier of 
China-the "National Army," or central force. 
(2) There are no real issues which concern the 
people closely in these manifold warrings. There-
fore, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOT 
ENGAGING IN THESE STRUGGLES. When I sav 
"the people" I mean those who are not officials or 
would-be-officials or ex-officials-and many as there 
are in the latter classes, still the people themselves 
number vastly more thousands! And it is true that 
the people themselves are not greatly concerned. 
They are not a disunited people or a people incapable 
of unification as many observers are fond of stating. 
There are no causes of quarrel, fundamentally, be-
tween the provinces in which Wu Pei-fu is supreme 
and those in which Feng Yu-hsiang has held sway; 
or between either of those and the people of Canton, 
or the areas farther west. The wars are leaders' 
wars, and are waged for personal power and control, 
almost invariably with little to choose between the 
combatants. 
The leaders are supported in their warfare by a 
mercenary or an impressed soldiery, and by funds 
levied as tax upon the merchants of the areas they 
control. A mercenary army is an understand~ble 
thing in China, where it is drawn from those. sectwns 
of a dense population whic are already facmg star-
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vation and which welcome even the precarious life 
of a soldier as a more certain means of subsistence. 
The essential point in answer number two is, 
therefore, that there is no real division between the 
people of North and South, Coast or Inland provinces. 
And the problem of the unification of China is, then, 
the problem (by no means a simple one) of ridding 
herself of her warring militarist leaders. 
GEOGRAPHICAL CAUSE FOR DISUNITY 
It is ·not easy for people living in a country so closely-
knit as America, a country of even mental unification 
where every morning the people of one State know pre-
cisely .what the people of ·their farthest-removed sister-
State have been doing in the few hours since the last news 
edition-it is not easy for people of such an environment 
and mental habit to comprehend China and the degree of 
her disunion. But that disunion is almost wholly 
physical in character. Perhaps we may come nearer to 
an understanding of the situation if we think of our own 
thirteen colonies and states before the days of train and 
telegraph, and the disunity that then prevailed from geo-
graphical conditions and social diversities. 
Consider a country with an area estimated at five 
million square miles, of which only the four hundred 
linear miles of coast territory are in any sense well con-
nected or easily accessible one part to another by rail, 
telegraph or water. Consider the huge interior area which 
is only sparsely and imperfectly touched by telegraph, 
where railroads do not exist, where the laborious travel 
by small river boat, cart or camel-train is made more 
uncertain and difficult by the natural obstacles of turbu-
lent rivers, rapids, ·floods, great mountain barriers, poor 
roads. 
Under such conditions it is scarcely reasonable to 
expect the people of Kansu Province, or . of distant 
Szechuan, which border on the Tibetan wastes and are 
months distant from Peking, to know of, much less com-
prehend and conform to, edicts from the temporary 
authority at Peking! And without the thought-unity that 
comes from a close news-intercouse it is a very difficult 
matter for a republican government to function over wide 
areas. 
During the Empire these distant provinces enjoyed a 
remarkably autonomous regime-under the governorship 
of an imported Manchu staff, it is true, and paying taxes 
to Peking, but otherwise practically cut off from central 
authority,' certainly cut off from participation in extra-
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provincial affairs or any constraint thereto. The removal 
of even a corrupt and tottering Imperial power, with no 
strong or organized force for its immediate replacement, 
could not, even though the agency be termed Revolution 
and the form Republic, bring about an instant con-
formity throughout a territory of vast distances and phy-
sical barriers. It did but increase the sense of local 
autonomy by removing the semblance of central author-
ity and failing to remove the local Big Men, their armies 
or their ambitions. 
PROVINCES BUT PAWNS 
Out of such a beginning China's fifteen years of non-
monarchial existence have been filled with an intensifica-
tion of inter-provincial warfare, manoeuvered by varying 
combinations of military power,-a warfare which has 
hampered and rendered well-nigh impossible the con-
structive efforts of nation and government builders. And 
there again the term. "inter-provincial" is misleading, for 
the provinces are but pawns in the hands of the militar-
ists-impressed suppliers of men and money for the 
armies, not truculent participants of themselves. While 
the leaders themselves,-old military governors, or 
bandit generals, or upstarts from· the ranks, whatnot-
are each pursuing his own personal dream of uniting all 
China under his own leadership; and to that end attempt-
ing to "pacify" his own particular provincial stronghold 
and consolidate his immediate neighbors under his com-
mand. The difficulty of each lies in the fact that "con-
solidation" means absorption of other lesser powers into 
his own; and in an atmosphere of personal ambitions, 
constrained subordination, individual jealousies, it is non-
sense to look for or expect such things as loyalty and 
trust among these enforced allies. A man is your ally 
or your subordinate until he sees a chance to take steps 
alone in his own direction, or an opportunity to gain 
further toward his own objective in the service of your 
rival. That is why it seems impossible that a decisive 
war or even battle can be fought out in this mass of mili-
tary unrest and intrigue. 
It is, in fact, this very indecisiveness which is the curse 
of the military situation today, and which, incidentally, 
renders it so puzzling and incomprehensible to the casual 
onlooker by reason of its continual shifting of face. No 
general is ever honest-to-goodness "licked." None is ever 
eliminated-unless he chances to be a rebelling subordi-
nate who is unlucky enough to fall into his erstwhile 
superior's clutches. Little does it count that day before 
yesterday Wu and Feng drove Chang outside the Great 
Wall, for yesterday Feng turned around and let him in 
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again and together they drove Wu into hiding; and today 
Chang and Wu have joined forces to castigate the too-
presumptuous Feng. Tomorrow-what? 
FOREIGN AID TO MILITARY CONTESTANTS 
A further element, intensifying the indecisiveness, has 
in the past been the ability of warring factions to secure 
the sinews of war from one or another of the foreign 
powers-some Chinese patriots say because it was to the 
interests of the powers to maintain a weak, unstable, impo-
tent China as the field for their enterprises. Some even 
say it has been a well-known policy for one Power to help 
finance two belligerents at the same time. It is likewise 
conceded by many of these same patriots that foreign 
subsidization alone does not keep the militarists solvent 
and functioning. The wealth of China herself is year 
after year scrunched within the mailed paws of the mili-
tarists-and the merchants under their domination seem 
helpless to withhold. 
These same foreign Powers are fond of saying offici-
ally-"If China does this and that," or "If the Chinese 
people stop their domestic quarrelling ... " as if there is 
at present · any functioning unit known as China which 
can issue and enforce an ultimatum; as if the Chinese 
people had anything to do with this incessant warring! 
The people themselves do nothing but suffer at the hands 
of the military under whose regime they exist-lose peace, 
prosperity, actual property, even lives in the wake of 
battles which do not otherwise concern them and which 
never settle anything. They are heartily wearied of the 
endless game; but so far, because there is little ease of 
communication between them there has been little possi-
bility of concerted action in self-defense. 
In some such concerted action, however, lies what looks 
like China's only hope of freeing herself from that incu-
bus, the Tuchun or military governor. And the fact that 
the people themselves are not divided by these struggles-
that in fact they loathe all militarists with an impartial 
loathing-is the one element that renders the situation 
hopeful. 
THE "BIG THREE" 
It is true that amongst the present Big Three who, 
first in one combination and then another, manipulate all 
the many lesser generals of Central, Western and North-
ern China in an incessant struggle for control, public 
opinion differs in its estimate, and some people incline to 
one and ' some to another as "the least bad." On the 
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whole, Wu Pei-fu has the odds in the popular favor-but 
chiefly as an individual, not as a leader of armies, as a 
civil administrator, or as a possible savior of China. He 
holds this lead by reason of his unimpeachable personal 
honesty (witness his comparative poverty and simplicity 
of life), by his unquestioned (if misguided) patriotism, 
and not least by reason of his strict bearing as a tradi-
tional hero, a Confucian ethicist of the classical type. 
On the other hand, the less conservative-minded of 
Young China are inclined to hold Feng Yu-hsiang as more 
modern, more nationalistic, more plastic, less the rigid 
conformist of the old fashion-in short, more hopeful as 
a potential doer of constructive things. Personally he 
is almost universally disliked, despised even, because of 
his unstability and unaccountability; but he has made a 
grand bid for popular suffrance in disciplining an army 
which does not prey upon the countryside it inhabits, and 
a ' still stronger bid for favor among participants in the 
nationalist movement by declaring boldly for a People's 
Army to :fight China's battles against foreign aggression 
-a safe enough gesture. 
It is safe to say that except among power-seekers, 
Chang Tso-lin is practically anathema. He is probably 
the most efficient and powerful militarist of them all, 
and with seeming taste for efficient government as well, 
as exemplified in Manchuria. But, strong man or not, 
honest man or not, he had his beginning as a bandit, a 
common "hung-hu-tze," and that the long memory of the 
Chinese people can neither forget nor forgive. 
This division of popular opinion can scarcely be said 
to go to the lengths of voluntary support, for all three 
men are considered enemies of the public peace and of 
constructive development. Yet strangely enough, the 
force of public like or dis like, while it cannot stem the 
tide of warfare can do much in swaying its success. So 
it means much to a leader to gain any degree of popular 
favor or suffrance, and he will take great pains to an-
nounce his plans and principles in populace-currying 
terms, or even, when convenient, to do constructive small-
scale works for the same purpose. 
CHINA'S ONE HOPE 
But in the long run, despite his efforts and his high-
sounding phrases, he gains little real popular favor. His 
deeds too greatly belie his words. Everywhere as a result 
the populace joins in futilely cursing the military. They 
suffer from victors and vanquished alike. And now there 
is a growing movement for making this popular cursing 
less futile,-a movement to translate it into action and 
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crystallize it into effectivity. So far the movement seems 
small and impotent, it is true, when compared with the 
vast field over which it has to work. But there were even 
smaller and more insignificant beginnings for that other 
amazing movement which fifteen years ago overthrew an 
Empire, in a tradition-loving land where Empire had for 
thousands of years existed. And both movements found 
or are finding their beginnings in the fiery-spirited, de-
termined student-class. Today this student-class is more 
widespread and more embracing than was its prototype 
of fi f teen or twenty years ago. 
If tha t other miracle coul d have happened (even poorly 
managed as it may have been) who can say that the 
·seemingly hopeless muddle of present-day militarism in 
China may not a lso be resolved, unexpectedly and com-
pletely. Come when it may, certain ly that miracle could 
never be branded as "premature," as the earlier has some-
times been! 
Let China's self-conscious youth get solid ly behind 
the slogan "Down With Militarists!" and I for one have 
faith in their ultimate achievement. It is China's one 
hope,-and a by no means hopeless one! 
Report submitted by 
ELIZABETH GREEN. 
Rep resentative in China. 
Peking, China, February, 1926 
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